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This work focuses on one of the most debated issues in international politics: the status 
of Palestine within the international community. I chose this topic because I think that too 
many times the issue of Palestine is analysed only within the context of the conflict with 
Israel, and there is a lack of analysis about the real status of Palestine in terms of being or 
not a state of the international community. Moreover, during the last years the strategy 
developed by Palestinian authorities shifted from negotiations with Israel in order to solve 
the conflict as the best path towards recognition, into a unilateral approach aimed at 
gaining recognition through bilateral and multilateral efforts. This raises new doubts and 
questions about the capacity of Palestine to be treated as a state within the international 
system. 
The main question I tried to answer in this work is “Is Palestine a state?”. It seems to be 
an easy one, but of course it is not. In order to do that I had to deal with other significant 
issues such as “Does Palestine fulfil the Montevideo criteria?”, “Did Palestine gain a level 
of recognition (bilateral and multilateral) satisfactory to be a state according to the 
constitutive theory?”, or “Do the difficulties for Palestine to obtain full membership in 
the United Nations (hereinafter, UN) affect its international status?”. In order to be 
exhaustive and precise in this analysis I made use of some of the most important books 
dealing with the theories of statehood and recognition, aiming at a full understanding of 
the theoretical framework of this topic.  Moreover, I examined many academic reviews 
expressing different points of view about Palestinian statehood, and it enabled me to 
compare ideas and have a whole view of the problem. Finally, I consulted many official 
documents of the UN, such as resolutions and reports, and of the Israeli and Palestinian 
governments.  
Regarding the general structure of this work, it is divided in three chapters plus the final 
conclusions. The first one is basically an explanation of the theoretical framework 
existing around the notions of statehood and recognition. After a brief analysis of the 
concept of state and its constitutive elements according to the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States (hereinafter, Montevideo Convention), I identified 
strengths and weaknesses of the two main theories in this field: declaratory and 
constitutive.  
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Then, in the second chapter, I applied the ideas settled in the first to the Palestinian case. 
Following a brief overview of the Palestinian claims since 1948 to the present, I tried to 
figure out if Palestine fulfils the four Montevideo criteria of statehood and then if it is or 
not a state according to the declaratory theory. I especially focused on the Palestinian 
capacity to enter into relations with other states, stressing how the strategy for political 
and diplomatic recognition changed from Arafat to Abbas and how it is affected by the 
impasse in negotiations with Israel.  
Finally, in the third chapter, I moved from the bilateral dimension of the Palestinian 
strategy for recognition to the multilateral one. I centred mainly in the way the 
relationship between Palestine and the UN evolved through the years, examining with 
special attention the legal and political implications of the historical decision by the 
General Assembly (hereinafter, GA) to upgrade the status of Palestine to non-member 
observer state in 2012. In the last part I focused on the Palestinian approach to 
international justice, especially the International Court of Justice and the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter, ICJ and ICC). Palestine membership in the ICC in 2015 was 
a huge success for enhancing its status in the international arena and could yield important 
consequences in shaping the conflict with Israel.  
In the last section, I collected all the ideas treated in the body of this work trying to answer 
to the questions that I raised. The results are quite interesting because they show to the 
readers a clearer image of Palestinian efforts in terms of statehood and recognition and if 
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1. INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATEHOOD AND RECOGNITION 
1.1 THE MONTEVIDEO CRITERIA OF STATEHOOD 
In the 21st century the concept of “state” remains a critical component of international 
law and international relations. Given its central role, there should be a clear and codified 
definition of state existing in international law. However, it is not the case, and even if 
since 1945 several attempts have been made to agree on such a definition, none of these 
efforts succeeded. Thus, the Montevideo Convention1 can still be considered, as Crawford 
argues, “the best-known formulation of the basic criteria for statehood”2. The Article 1 
enunciates that “The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) 
capacity to enter into relations with other states3.  
Starting from the territorial aspect of statehood, it is obvious that states are territorial 
entities. Firstly, this element requires the exercise of governmental power over some 
territory, without specifying a minimum area for the purpose of fulfilling this condition. 
For example, Tuvalu, a state of only 26sq km, obtained independence in 1978 and became 
a full member of the UN in 2000. Furthermore, the territory of the state in international 
law does not require continuity of the territory4. About the second element, a permanent 
population, it is probably the least controversial of the four traditional statehood 
benchmarks. It is necessary for statehood, and it is connected with the territorial 
dimension, because “if states are territorial entities, they are also aggregates of 
individuals”5. Moreover, like in the case of territory, no minimum population is required. 
The third requirement is the presence of a government capable of exercising independent 
and effective authority over the population and the territory. Fundamentally, it must be 
shown that the territory has a government who is independent, control the affairs of the 
                                                          
1 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States was signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on 
26 Decemnber 1933, during the Seventh International Conference of American States. Even if the 
Convention was signed only by 19 states, it has been almost universally accepted as the main reference in 
order to identify the constitutive elements of states. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(Uruguay, Seventh International Conference of American States, 26 December 1933), Article 1. 
https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf (Last accessed 15 December 2017). 
2 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 4. 
3 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1. 
4 Rewand Hajjaj, “International Recognition Evolving Statehood Criterion: Comparative Analysis of 
Palestine and Kosovo” (Central European University, Department of Legal Studies, 2012), 6. 
5 Crawford, The Creation of States in International law, 46. 
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state and ensures social and legal order. Nonetheless, if a state ceases temporarily to have 
an effective government (think about scenarios of civil war) this does not mean that the 
state disappeared6. The fourth and last requirement for statehood according to the 
Montevideo Convention, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, refers to the 
legal capacity of an entity to participate in public international relations, including the 
legal competence to carry out its obligations7. There is a debate between those who argue 
that it is a defining element of statehood, and who sees it as a consequence and not a 
prerequisite of being a state. Currently, the second option seems to be the preferred one. 
The idea is that if an entity meets the first three criteria (a territory, a population, and a 
government) it can be considered a state and therefore has the ability to enter into relations 
with other states, and not the other way around. As Crawford argued, “capacity to enter 
into relations with other states is not a criterion, but rather a consequence of statehood, 
and one which is not constant but depends on the status and situation of particular 
states”8.  
Therefore, the Montevideo Convention and the prevailing law at the time, viewed states 
as a kind of sui generis legal entity operating and existing under its own authority and 
power. However, it seems that it falls short in many senses, because it did not include 
political criteria and considerations which are relevant in states’ discourses. It is really 
complex to codify a new definition of state, a concept whose meaning depends heavily 
on the context, which has changed since the framing of the Convention. The search for a 
definition gets bogged down almost immediately in a long-running debate that deeply 
divides the international legal scene: is recognition an essential requirement for statehood 
or rather a confirmation of a pre-existing factual situation?9  
1.2 THEORIES OF STATEHOOD: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
The current body of international rules governing the process of state recognition finds 
itself in an existential crisis. Even though the applicability of a basic set of legal rules on 
the recognition of states remains the starting point of much legal scholarship, the practice 
                                                          
6 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 121. 
7 Jianming Shen, “Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the issue of Taiwan”, American 
University International Law Review 15, no.5 (2000): 1106. 
8 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 116. 
9 Cedric Ryngaert & Sven Sobrie, “Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice 
of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia”, Leiden Journal of International Law 
24 (May 2011): 469.  
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of the last years seems to draw a different reality in which political convenience rather 
than legal norms plays the leading role. This is reflected in the debate existing between 
supporters of the declaratory and the constitutive theory, whose views about recognition 
is completely opposite. 
1.2.1 The Declaratory Theory 
This doctrine owes to the traditional positivist thought on the supremacy of the state and 
the concomitant weakness or non-existence of any central guidance in the international 
community. According to the declaratory school, an entity in order to become an existent 
state has simply to fulfil the legal statehood criteria as required under international law, 
in particular those defined in the Montevideo Convention: defined territory, permanent 
population, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The 
recognition is just the mere acknowledgment of its existence10. Article 3 provides that 
“The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states”11, while 
Article 6 affirms that “The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which 
recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined 
by international law”12. Thus, recognition is seen as a political act, not a necessary 
element for statehood. It is almost irrelevant because the status of statehood is based on 
facts and not on individual state discretion, and if statehood is a fact, then recognition 
should be automatic13. In current doctrine and jurisprudence, the declaratory is the 
dominant theory. One of the most important reasons of its success lies in the fact that it 
establishes a primacy of objective legal norms over political arbitrariness deriving from 
states’ decisions about statehood. It deprives states of the right to determine the legal 
status of an entity according to their own political convenience14.  
However, there are criticisms of this theory. The first one lies in the practical 
consequences of being a state according to the Montevideo criteria, which are little 
without recognition. This impede to act as a state in the whole sense of the term. In fact, 
states do not acquire international rights on the international plane until they are 
recognized by other states. The fact that recognition empowers states with these rights 
                                                          
10 Ibidem, 470. 
11 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 3. 
12 Ibidem, Article 6. 
13 William T. Worster, ʺLaw, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State recognition theory“, Boston 
University International Law Journal  27, no. 1 (August 2009): 119. 
14 Brandon R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 128. 
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changes the expectations of the others encouraging them to make peaceful choices15. 
Another problem arising out the declaratory theory is the absence in international law of 
mechanisms for authoritatively determining whether an entity fulfils the factual criteria 
for statehood. Moreover, this doctrine does not look at the way the entity has acquired 
necessary requirements, and this is a severe deficiency assumed that states can come into 
being through grave violations of international law. State practice responds to such events 
by not granting recognition to these entities, but this kind of sanction is meaningless 
within the framework of the declaratory theory16. Finally, another major point of 
disapproval concerns the argument that if a state exists in fact, it must exist in law. As 
Raič argues, “the theory assumes that the mere factual situation, which is the direct result 
of the fulfilment of the criteria for statehood would lead ipso facto to international 
personality, which is incorrect”17. International personality cannot be the consequence of 
a factual situation, rather it is the result of an international legal rule. Thus, a state is not 
an international person because it satisfies Montevideo criteria, but because international 
law confers international personality to such factual situation.   
1.2.2 The Constitutive Theory 
The constitutive view holds that an entity’s very legal existence as part of the international 
system is constituted by the recognition of the other entities making up the system. This 
places considerable significance on the satisfaction of the criteria for statehood set up in 
Montevideo, but it requires something more, precisely the recognition of the new states 
by existing ones18. The constitutive view is typically associated with the positivist 
conception that law among nations arises as the product of sovereign consent. The 
principle lies in the assumption that legal relations between two entities who are not 
subject to a superior legal order can arise only as the result of mutual recognition of 
international personality. Given the fact that international law lacks mechanisms to 
determine whether an entity fulfils the factual criteria for statehood, the proponents of the 
constitutive theory highlight the importance attached to recognition by existing states. In 
their opinion, the international law provides existing states the freedom to determine in 
                                                          
15 Worster, “Law, Politics and the Conception of the State in State Recognition Theory”, 119. 
16 Ryngaert & Sobrie, “Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition 
in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia”, 470. 
17 David Raič, Statehood and the Law of the Self-Determination (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002), 38.  
18 Amy, R. Eckert, “Constructing States: The Role of the International Community”, Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 13 (Spring 2002): 24. 
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each case whether an entity meets or not the necessary criteria for statehood, through 
recognition. It is a condition sine qua non, necessary to close the gap between the general 
rules of international law and the specific facts on which these rules should be applied. 
This theory is also supported by the notion that obligations that states must fulfil in the 
international community come from individual state consent, and as Crawford argues 
“while the existence of a new state will bring such legal obligation to the existing state, 
the existence of this new state should be by the consent of the existing state”19. 
However, like for the declaratory theory, the constitutive is object of diverse criticisms 
too. At a very concrete level, questions arise as to how many recognizing states are needed 
before an entity turns into a state and whether the decision to recognize should be the 
result of an evaluation of the facts or should be based on norms or geopolitical 
considerations. This is a serious drawback, because most of the times a new entity has 
been recognized only by a part of the international community, and this makes difficult 
to determine if a new state emerged or not according to the constitutive theory20. The 
constitutive theory does not define precise criteria and thresholds to say what the number 
of recognizing states is enough. It has been criticized also from a theoretical point of view. 
According to Worster, it is not attractive in that “it permits states to ignore the facts, i.e. 
the existence of a state, acting as such and acknowledged as such by national and perhaps 
neighbours”21. The theory argues that an unrecognized state will not have rights and 
duties towards the world order, and this means that it can invade any state and it can be 
invaded by any state. However, there is no evidence to suggest that states regard 
unrecognized states as if they would not exist. On the contrary, regardless of international 
recognition, a supposed state might exercise its authority over its nationals without regard 
to the position of other states, even if they do not believe it fulfils the criteria for statehood. 
This way results in the assignment of recognition to the purely political process based on 
a high level of discretion, rather than legal and right-based process. These assumptions 
raise questions over the credibility of this theory. 
The wide gap between the constitutive theory, in which recognition is fully normative, 
and its declarative counterpart, in which recognition has no normative value, seems 
                                                          
19 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 13. 
20 The constitutive theory is precise only when it comes to unilateral recognition, which, in the words of 
Cassese, ʺcannot be constitutiveʺ. Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 49. 
21 Worster, ʺLaw, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State recognition Theoryˮ, 120. 
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unbridgeable. However, with the aim to resolve this theoretical debate, some authors 
proposed a third system in which statehood is seen in terms of effectiveness, and 
recognition would be a tool to raise this effectiveness. According to this view, recognition 
is both constitutive and declaratory. Constitutive because it creates relations between the 
recognizing and the recognized state, and declaratory since it does not grant statehood on 
the entity22. However, instead of trying to solve the theoretical debate, it seems more 
helpful to question its practical relevance, looking at the concrete advantages deriving 
from recognition and how the international community deals with this issue.  
1.3 EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION AND STATE PRACTICE 
According to present-day practice, recognition has only a declaratory character. The state 
comes into existence as soon as it fulfils the elements of statehood identified in the 
Montevideo Convention23. The legal existence of a state is not dependent on whether it 
has been recognized as such by other states and recognition is much more a question of 
policy than of law. However, even if it is not generally considered as a requirement for 
statehood, international recognition plays a crucial role in determining the actual rights 
of the state at the international level. In fact, only once the new state has been recognized 
it becomes a subject of international law with all the rights and obligations that it 
encompasses24. In other words, recognition determines whether or not statehood can be 
exercised in any practical sense within the international community.  
States which have not obtained a diffuse recognition are generally called de facto states25. 
In the words of Scott Pegg, “a de facto state exists where there is an organized political 
leadership which […] receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to 
provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area”26. 
                                                          
22 Ryngaert & Sobrie, “Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition 
in the wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia”, 470-71. 
23 In more recent international practice, several additional criteria have been identified as prerequisites for 
statehood. The recognition policy of many states and the positions taken by contemporary jurists indicate 
that the traditional criteria for statehood are being extended to include additional elements. They require, 
for instance, that an entity seeking recognition demonstrate that it has not been established as the result of 
illegality, that it is willing and able to abide by international law, that it constitutes a viable entity, and that 
its claim to statehood is compatible with the right to self-determination. 
24 Christian Hillgruber, “The Admission of New States to the International Community”, European Journal 
of International Law 9 (February 1998): 492. 
25 Different terms are used to define these kind of states. For instance contested states or states with limited 
recognition.  
26 Scott Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System”, Institute of International Relations of the 
University of British Columbia, no. 21 (February 1998): 2. 
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However, it is unable to achieve widespread international recognition and remain 
illegitimate in the eyes of international society. The problem with de facto states is that 
the lack of recognition hinders them from benefitting of all the advantages related with 
the achievement of a de iure status. These can be summarized in four points: 
• only recognized states may be part of international treaties with other states; 
• only recognized states can be full members of intergovernmental organizations 
like the UN, the IMF or the WB; 
• only recognized states have the power to bring claims against other states before 
the ICJ; 
• finally, recognized states are the unique recipients of Foreign Direct Investments 
from the IMF or the WB27.  
Take the case of Somaliland, which is considered one of the most prominent examples of 
de facto state. It has been independent since the end of Siad Barrer’s regime and the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1991, organizing independently local and national elections 
and writing a constitution. Moreover, it has a functioning police force and a governmental 
body with authority over people. Virtually Somaliland meets all the legal criteria for 
statehood, but it is not recognized by any other state. Therefore, its internal sovereignty 
without recognition means little for its external affairs, impeding it to become a full 
member of international society. Somaliland is not an isolated case and reflects a diffuse 
practice among states which seem to favour the maintenance of the status quo rather than 
supporting the inclusion of new states in the international community28. In the eternal 
debate between self-determination and territorial integrity, the latter seems to 
predominate. Outside the context of the decolonization in the 60’s and the disintegration 
of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 90’s, states have been careful in recognizing 
secessionist entities29. Political and strategic considerations, especially the fear of a 
                                                          
27 Bridget L. Coggins, “Secession, Recognition and the International Politics of Statehood” (Ohio State 
University, Department of Philosophy, 2006), 46-47. 
28 According to Deon Geldenhuys, in 2009 there were ten cases of de facto or contested states, which after 
a declaration of independence have not obtained widespread recognition by other states. These are: South 
Ossetia & Abkhazia, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Somaliland, Kosovo and Palestine. Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
29 Recognition is, to some extent, linked to the way in which the new state comes into existence. In the case 
of decolonization movements and the disintegration of the USSR, there were the consent of the central 
authorities of the former states. When the secession is uncontested, recognition is likely. The case of 
Yugoslavia was also an exception, because of its historical development and the recognized violation of 
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domino effect which could put in danger the territorial integrity of many states of the 
world, are still decisive in shaping the recognition’s discourse. 
 
2. THE CASE OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD 
2.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF PALESTINIANS CLAIMS  
There are some events which played a crucial role in determining the actual status of 
Palestine and its claims for statehood and recognition. The territory of Palestine from 
which both Israel and Palestine originated, was part of the Ottoman Empire. With the end 
of the World War I, which implied its disintegration, its territory was placed under the 
League of Nations Mandate system, with Great Britain exerting as the Mandatory power. 
The Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, referring to the so-called “Class 
A Mandates”, such as Palestine, provided them with the provisional recognition of “their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering 
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able 
to stand alone”30. The intention was to set up one or more independent nations from the 
British Mandate. After the World War II, due to its incapacity to cope with revolts from 
both sides, the spread of violence, and a massive Jewish migration from Europe, Great 
Britain decided to bring the question of Palestine before the United Nations General 
Assembly (hereinafter, UNGA). On 29 November 1947, it adopted Resolution 181, 
approving the Partition Plan, which included the creation of an Arab and a Jewish state 
not later than October 1948, the division of Palestine into eight parts (three conferred to 
the Arab state and three to the Jewish one) and an international administration regime for 
Jerusalem. 
On 14 May 1948, the same day as the British Mandate expired, Israel was unilaterally 
established as an independent state, and immediately recognized by the US and the Soviet 
                                                          
human rights against ethnic minorities. Except these cases, only Bangladesh’s attempt of secession from 
Pakistan was successful and now Bangladesh is a recognized state member of the UN. Currently, the 
practise has not changed significantly, and any new states created without consent have been fully 
recognized by the other states. In order to have a deeper vision of secessionism in theory and practice look 
at: Aleksandar Pavkovic & Peter Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2008); Percy. B. Lehning, Theories of Secession (London & New York: Routledge, 
1998). 
30The Covenant of the League of Nations (Paris: Paris Peace Conference, 28 June 1919). 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html (Last Accessed 27 December 2017). 
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Union. In the Israeli Declaration of Independence there is a reference to the UNGA 
Resolution 181, as recognizing the right of the Jewish people to establish a state. 
Therefore, it could be argued that also the Palestinian state could lie on the same 
resolution as a source of legitimacy of a unilateral declaration of independence31. 
Following the declaration, hostilities broke out between Arab and Jewish communities, 
and neighbouring Arab states entered the territory in assistance of the Palestinians. The 
1948 Arab-Israeli war ended with Israel in control of much of the territory conferred to 
the Arab state by the Partition Plan, including West Jerusalem, and Egypt and Jordan 
respectively managing the remaining portions of Gaza and the West Bank. A victorious 
Israel had not only retained its status as a new state but had also increased its territory by 
almost 50%32. Because of the war, a major humanitarian crisis had been created, with 
almost 750,000 Palestinians displaced from their own land33. This is important because 
the right of return of the Palestinian refugees is one of the unresolved issues of the 
conflict. Later in 1949, the Armistice Agreement was signed between Israel, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, which set up the so called “Green Lines”34. Boundaries also 
became one of the critical unresolved issues when discussing the territorial configuration 
of the Palestinian state.  
Another past event to be considered took place in 1964, when a conference backed by the 
Arab League held in Jerusalem brought to the creation of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (hereinafter, PLO), to act as the government of the Palestinians35. It rapidly 
gained the support of most of the Arab League governments, which offered to the PLO a 
seat in the organization. On the other side, the relations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours were characterized by a growing tension due to raising security concerns. This 
situation of stalemate came to an end in 1967, when Israel launched a series of pre-
emptive attacks against Egyptian airfields, followed by troops’ mobilization. This would 
                                                          
31 Errol Mendes, “Statehood and Palestine for the purpose of Article 12 (3) of the ICC Statute”, University 
of Ottawa, (2010): 4. 
32 To the historians of Israel, the conflict became the War of independence, while for the Palestinians, due 
to the catastrophic result of the war, it was symbolized by the term “Nakba”. It is often considered as the 
beginning of the contemporary history of Palestine, made of violent suppression, catastrophic changes and 
fight not to disappear.  
33 United Nations, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations, (New York: Department of Public 
Information of the United Nations, 2008), 10. 
34 The Green Line is the demarcation line set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements. It serves as the de facto 
borders of the state of Israel from 1949 until the Six-Day War in 1967. 
35 John Quigley, The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133. 
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later be known as the War of 1967, or the Six-Day War, which will exert a significant 
effect in awakening Palestinian nationalism, as Israel gained the authority of the West 
Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt in a short but intense war in which Israel 
took advantage of its clear military superiority. Finally, Israel defeated Syria controlling 
the Golan Heights, and also Jerusalem was occupied, including all the holy sites36. All 
the events that took place during 1948 and 1967 wars significantly shaped the framework 
of peace talks because it was during those conflicts that some of the core issues emerged. 
Palestinian refugees, control of Jerusalem and mutual recognition of statehood still today 
dominate discussions and remained largely unresolved in the peace negotiations37.  
In 1974 the PLO was granted observer status in the UN, as the representative of the 
Palestinian Arabs. The GA, in a resolution adopted on 22 November 1974, invited the 
PLO to participate in its sessions in the capacity of observer. This was an important step 
for Palestinians, because it showed that UN backed a longstanding peaceful solution to 
the conflict. Moreover, the GA reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, 
such as the right of self-determination, sovereignty and national independence. The 
following years were characterized by political turbulence and failed attempts of 
negotiations. After the 1973 Yon Kippur war, in which Israel defeated Egypt and Syria, 
tension lessened between Israel and Arab countries. In 1977 Sadat, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, travelled to Jerusalem to meet with Israeli government, and his visit brought to 
the 1978 Camp David Accords. Sadat, Begin and Carter negotiated two different issues: 
the first one led to the bilateral peace treaty between Israel and Egypt38, while the second 
focused on Palestine led to autonomy talks which ended in 198039. Despite these efforts, 
tension between Palestinians and Israel rose during the 80’s, due to Israel’s territorial 
occupation and discrimination of the Palestinians. In December 1987, twenty years after 
the beginning of the occupation, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank erupted in a 
spontaneous popular uprising that was known as the intifada (which in Arab means 
“shaking off”). Palestinians used mainly rocks, tires and molotov cocktails. However, 
                                                          
36 Suzanne Kelly Panganiban, “Palestinian Statehood: A Study of Statehood through the Lens of the 
Montevideo Convention” (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Master of Arts in Political 
Science, 2015), 42-43. 
37 Ibidem, 44-45. 
38 Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. 
39 Negotiations failed because Palestinians did not accept Israel limited authority in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, while Israel refused to accept the PLO as the Palestinian negotiator. Look at: Jeremy Pressman 
“A brief history of the Arab-Israeli conflict” University of Connecticut (May 2005): 9. 
http://web.uconn.edu/polisci/people/faculty/doc/history_pressman.pdf (Last accessed 5 January 2018). 
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Israeli army’s response was disproportionate and in the next six years, over 1,000 
Palestinians were killed, and much more were wounded40.  
The negotiation process resumed in October 1991, with the convening of the Peace 
Conference on the Middle-East held in Madrid. It established bilateral talks between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours (Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), while the Palestinians were 
included in a delegation together with Jordan. Multilateral Working Groups on different 
issues were also established, but the negotiations proved difficult especially when it came 
to final borders, Jerusalem, Palestine’s future status, Israeli settlements and Palestinian 
refugees. Parallelly to the labour of the working groups, in the summer of 1993 in Oslo, 
secret Israeli-Palestinian talks led to a major breakthrough. Israel and the PLO signed the 
Declaration of Principles (hereinafter, DOP). The PLO officially recognized the right of 
Israel to exist, committed to fight against terrorism, and accepted United Nations Security 
Council (hereinafter, UNSC) Resolution 24241. Israel finally recognized the PLO as its 
legitimate negotiating partner. The DOP called for Israeli withdrawal from a not specified 
territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and for the creation of the Palestinian 
Authority (hereinafter, PA), a five-year interim self-government body in the areas which 
Israel committed to return to Palestinian control in Gaza and the West Bank. These 
arrangements were supposed to last for 5 years, during which the most difficult matters, 
such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements and definite borders should 
have been settled in final status negotiations. The two sides negotiated other agreements 
with the aim to implement the Oslo Accords, including the Gaza-Jericho agreement in 
May 199442, and the Oslo II agreement in September 1995. The latter was particularly 
important because it divided the West Bank (except for East Jerusalem and parts of 
Hebron) into Areas A, B and C. In Area A, the PLO was responsible for civil affairs and 
maintaining order; in the Area B only for civil affairs, while security and order were in 
the hands of Israel; in the Area C Israel remained in full control43. However, the Oslo 
peace process came to an end because both sides did not respect the agreements they 
                                                          
40 United Nations, The question of Palestine and the United Nations, 27. 
41 UNSC Resolution 242 was adopted for unanimity on 22 November 1967, in the aftermath of the Six-Day 
War. It stated the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and fixed the principles of a lasting 
peace in the Middle-East region: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories under occupation 
because of the 1967 war; and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every state in the area.   
42 The Treaty provided for Palestinian limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip within five years, 
Israel promised to withdraw partly from Jericho region in the West Bank and from Gaza.  
43 Pressman, “A brief history of the Arab-Israeli conflict”, 11. 
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signed. Israel intensified its settlement expansion, while on the Palestinian side the PA 
was not able to block terrorist attacks against Israel by radical Islamists groups, such as 
Hamas, which believed in the armed struggle as the best way to resist. 
The last attempt to find an agreement towards a two-state solution was sponsored by 
President Clinton in 2000, in Camp David. He presented a proposal suggesting the 
parameters for a final compromise, but fundamental divisions remained about all the most 
important issues on the table, especially the future of Jerusalem and the Palestinian 
refugees. In the following years both parties confirmed that they had never been so close 
to an agreement as in December 2000. Immediately after the failure of Camp David II, 
the second Palestinian intifada began, and it was still bloodier than the first. Israeli 
military forces responded attacking populations in Ramallah, Gaza and elsewhere using 
missiles and heavy weapons44. In 2003, in an effort to revive peace talks, both parties 
accepted the “Road Map to Peace”45, launched by the Quartet, formed by UN, US, Russia 
and the European Union (hereinafter, EU). Unfortunately, tensions renewed following 
Hamas electoral victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections held in 2006. Israel 
launched a series of strong military operations in Gaza against Hamas, provoking a wide 
rejection by the international community for the disproportionate weight of the attacks46. 
By February 2009, a ceasefire agreement was established with international mediation, 
though sporadic episodes of violence did not disappear.  
Last years have been characterised by a stalemate in terms of negotiation progresses. Both 
Israel and Palestine are struggling with internal problems which favour the status quo. 
Israel is taking advantage of the current situation to extend Jewish settlement and to keep 
discriminating Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinians Territories (hereinafter, OPT). 
Moreover, the election of Trump played in favour of Netanyahu’s government, clearly 
backed by the new US administration much more than how Obama did47. A clear proof 
                                                          
44 Joel Beinin & Lisa Hajjar, “Palestine, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli conflict: a primer”, Middle East 
Research and Information Project, 12 February 2014. 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/sper/images/Palestine-Israel_Primer_MERIP.pdf. (Last accessed 13 
January 2018). 
45 The Road Map consisted of three phases leading to the establishment of a “democratic Palestinian state” 
and to a “final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005”: 1) end of terrorism 
and violence and transforming the PA; 2) creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders by the end 
of 2003; 3) launch of final negotiations toward a permanent resolution of the conflict by 2005.  
46 The bloodiest operation organized by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was the so-called Operation Cast 
Lead, in 2008. One year after, 1440 Palestinians were killed, over half of them civilians.   
47 Obama, with a surprising move just before the end of its mandate, decided not to use the US veto in the 
UNSC, allowing for the first resolution regarding Israel and Palestine to pass after nearly eight years. This 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                                                                       N˚ 6/2018, 19 DE MAYO 2018 




of it is the decision by the current US President to declare Jerusalem as Israel’s capital 
and to move the embassy there. It was a dangerous decision which could break out 
decades of diplomatic consensus over the status of the holy city and could provoke an 
escalation of violence48. 
2.2 PALESTINIAN FULFILMENT OF THE MONTEVIDEO CRITERIA 
All the events analysed above shaped the status of Palestine within the international 
system and affected, positively and negatively, its capacity to fulfil the Montevideo 
criteria for statehood. An interesting debate exists among scholars about this issue, and 
divisions rose between those supporting its bid for statehood and those who think 
Palestine does not accomplish with some of the Montevideo criteria. The first condition 
to be satisfied, before to examine the fulfilment of these criteria, is the existence of a 
motivation to be a state, because without this determination to be recognized as a state 
the fulfilment of the Montevideo criteria turns into a mere symbolic fact49. In the case of 
Palestine, this determination exists. The 1988 Declaration of Independence made by the 
PLO stated that “The Palestinian National Council […] proclaims the establishment of 
the state of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem”50.  
The first criterion to take into consideration is the existence of a defined territory and 
there is little discussion about its completion by Palestine. Though the most of them are 
contested with Israel, Palestine has established its borders, and an overwhelming majority 
of the international community, included the UN and the EU, recognizes the “Green 
Lines” as the legitimate partition between Palestinian and Israeli territory, with the former 
including West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Since the Oslo Accords to the 
present, the international community has agreed that regarding the border issue Palestine 
and Israel should use the pre-1967 borders as a starting point for further discussions51. 
                                                          
decision was criticized by Netanyahu and Trump, but it was backed by the majority of the international 
community. The resolution condemned Israeli settlement activity as illegal and demanding that Israel 
immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the 'occupied' Palestinian territory, including 
east Jerusalem. 
48 Michael Wilner, “Trump announces US moving embassy to Jerusalem”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 December 
2017. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/WATCH-LIVE-Trump-delivers-much-anticipated-
announcement-about-Jerusalem-517201 (Last accessed 13 January 2018). 
49 For instance, the case of Taiwan is really revealing. Taiwan is an entity whose fulfilment of the 
Montevideo criteria is quite accepted. However, currently it is not claiming statehood and recognition to be 
a fully independent state.  
50 Palestinian Declaration of Independence (Alger: Palestine Liberation Organization, 15 November 1988). 
http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm. (Last accessed 26 January 2018). 
51 Susan Panganiban, “Palestinian Statehood: A Study of Statehood through the Lens of the Montevideo 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                                                                       N˚ 6/2018, 19 DE MAYO 2018 




Moreover, the territorial integrity of Palestine has also been recognized by the Security 
Council (hereinafter, SC) through Resolution 242, which called for the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from territories occupied during the Six-Day War, and by the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the OPT52. 
Critics raise some arguments arguing that Palestinian territory is fragmented, imprecisely 
delimitated and disputed with Israel. Regarding the first point, it is an objective evidence 
that the territory of Palestine is fragmented. However, as outlined by Crawford, the 
territory of a state in international law does not require continuity53. Secondly, a state has 
not the obligation to have declared borders. The case of Israel is indicative that not having 
fixed and determined borders is not seen as an obstacle to be considered a state54. 
Moreover, it is quite clear reading at the Palestinian Declaration of Independence that the 
PLO had in mind what should be the territory of the Palestinian state, consisting of the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, with East Jerusalem being its capital. The same we can 
conclude about borders disputes with Israel. There are other states with this kind of 
territorial disputes without this affecting its existence as states55. Therefore, even if Israel 
continues to maintain forces at the borders and to build settlements impeding to 
Palestinians an effective control over territories, Palestine has a defined territory within 
the meaning of the Montevideo Convention.  
In relation to the second criterion, it is important to separate the concepts of nation and 
permanent population. It is undeniable that Palestinians are a nation. They have resided 
within its territory since time immemorial and shared a common culture, identity and 
traditional practices. These are exemplified through a common language that is spoken, 
similar habits and traditions, all indicators of a shared identity. Moreover, the existence 
of a Palestinian people has never been questioned at the international level. The mandate 
recognized the existence of a population of Palestinians, and it was influenced by the 
purpose to secure the population’s right to self-determination56. Even after the 
                                                          
Convention”, 63. 
52 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion (The Hague, International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. (Last accessed 27 January 2018). 
53 Crawford, The creation of States in International Law, 47. 
54 Francis A. Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine”, European Journal of International Law 1, no. 
1 (January 1990): 301. 
55 For instance, India and Pakistan dispute for the Kashmir region, the East China Sea claimed by China 
and Japan, or the Western Sahara in Northwest Africa, where Morocco pushed the indigenous population 
of Sahrawis out of the area. 
56 Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine”, 302.  
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establishment of the state of Israel, the international community recognized repeatedly 
the existence of a Palestinian community. The UN and the rest of the world always use 
the words “Palestinians” or “Palestinian refugees” when they refer to population of Gaza 
and the West Bank, and to the Palestinian refugees worldwide. Thus, the international 
community, acknowledged the existence of a community of individuals of shared origins. 
Initially Israel claimed that the Palestinians were not a people for the purpose of the 
population requirement of statehood, because of a supposed lack of continuity of 
Palestinian national identity through the decades. Israel backed the idea that Palestinians 
are simply Arabs and therefore not forming a separate people from that of surrounding 
Arab states. Anyway, if we look at some government documents, Israel refers to 
Palestinians implicitly admitting that they are a nation57. However, what is important here 
is not if Palestinians are a people, but if Palestinian authorities has control over a 
permanent population, independently on the fact that it is made only by Palestinians or 
not. In this case these two concepts coincide, because basically population in the OPT is 
made mostly by Palestinians. Today, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Palestine has a total population of five million people approximately, with more than three 
million living in the West Bank and almost two million residing in the Gaza Strip58. 
However, seventy years of conflict also produced a huge refugee crisis and currently there 
are more than five million of Palestinians living far from their land, mostly concentrated 
in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria59. As a conclusion, we can affirm that the Palestinian 
authorities exert a control over a permanent population in the OPT. 
The third criterion identified in Montevideo is the presence of an effective government, 
whose fulfilment by Palestinian authorities represents a more complex issue. Before 
evaluating the grade of accomplishment of this condition in the case of Palestine, it seems 
useful to sum up the governmental structure and the different actors involved in the 
governance of the OPT. Established in 1964, the PLO emerged with the aim to represent 
the Palestinian people. In its early years, it was seen as an extension of Arab regimes, 
especially the Egypt of Nasser, without possessing complete autonomy over its decision-
                                                          
57 Joshua Berzak, “The Palestinian Bid for Statehood: Its Repercussions for Business and Law”, Journal of 
International Business Law 12, no. 1 (2013): 14. 
58Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Population Indicators 2017”.  
http://pcbs.gov.ps/site/langen/881/default.aspx#Population. (Last Accessed 4 February 2018). 
59 According to the UNRWA in 2017 there were 5,340,443 registered Palestinian refugees. The countries 
which received most of them are Jordan (2,175,491), Lebanon (463,664) and Syria (543,014).  
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making60. However, after the defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War the PLO gained more 
international reputation. A decade after its creation, it was recognized as the Palestinians’ 
sole legitimate representative by the Arab League and the UNGA through Resolution 
67/19, which upgraded Palestine to non-member observer status. In 1988 the Palestinian 
National Council (hereinafter, PNC), the legislative body of the PLO, adopted the 
Palestinian Declaration of Independence. It was proclaimed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman 
of the PLO, which assumed also the title of first President of Palestine. Arafat and the 
PLO acted as the diplomatic face of the Palestinians, such as in the negotiations of the 
Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993. They brought to the establishment of the PA, which 
was created as a five-year interim body with the aim to oversee Palestinian affairs in the 
OPT. It exceeded its initial five-year mandate and a complex web of political 
representation emerged. However, it is the PLO, and not the PA, who handles negotiations 
with Israel and operates embassies and diplomatic missions around the world61. The PLO 
includes several political parties, though it has been dominated by Fatah, which gradually 
abandoned its previous stance against the existence of Israel and in favour of a military 
solution to the conflict. Since the 90’s, Hamas challenged the primacy of Fatah and 
carried out a series of suicide attacks against Israel in order to undermine the peace 
process. It was not until March 2005, after the election of Mahmoud Abbas as President 
of the PA, following Arafat’s death, that Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement in Cairo 
in which the former committed to end terrorism against Israel62. In the legislative 
elections held in 2006 Hamas surprisingly won, achieving the majority of the seats in the 
Palestinian Legislative Council. Fatah and other factions refused to participate in the new 
government because of differences in the political program. After the intensification of 
the clashes between the two factions at the beginning of 2007, an agreement was signed 
in Mecca which brought to the formation of a government of national unity. 
Unfortunately, it was dismantled by another explosion of violence through which Hamas 
seized control of the Gaza Strip, while Fatah consolidated its control over the West Bank, 
paving the way for two separate Palestinian governments. Even if some attempts of 
                                                          
60 Salem Barahmeh, “The Palestinians, the PLO, and Political Representation: the Search for Palestinian 
Self-Determination”, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (June 
2014): 7.  
61 Yaghi Mohammad, “Hamas Challenge to the PLO: Opportunities and Prospects”, The Washington 
Institute, 9 February 2009. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-challenge-to-
the-plo-opportunities-and-prospects (Last accessed 23 February 2018). 
62  Ibidem. 
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reconciliation have been made, they were not implemented, and now there exists a 
complex internal situation which in a certain sense could undermine the future of 
Palestine. Anyway, despite the political conflicts emerged inside the PA, we can say that 
under Abbas it has established governmental functions close to those of a state 
government and that great progresses have been made in terms of democratic processes63. 
However, it is still debatable whether the Palestinian government exercises sufficient 
authority over its territories. It has full control only over parts of them, while in others, 
specifically the West Bank, it is only partial as Israel possesses almost the 60%. Further 
critical arguments claim that important areas of governmental authority such as external 
and border security were never transferred to the PA, while remained in Israeli hands. 
However, the limitation on its responsibilities does not necessarily defeat the requirement 
of effective government, because international law does not oblige an entity to have all 
these competences and powers in order to satisfy the government criterion64. We can 
sustain that the competencies transferred to the PA with the Interim Agreement are the 
evidence that Palestine has a government because the PA is responsible for almost all the 
most important governmental services, such as a judiciary and a police force, legislative 
and executive authority including education, tourism, culture, social welfare, taxation and 
so on65. 
About the last criterion, the accepted idea is that an entity which is not able to enter into 
relations with other states cannot be defined as a state. Those who back the idea that 
Palestine does not fulfil this criterion refer to the DOP, according to which the PA will 
not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations. It excludes from 
Palestinian competences the decision on the establishment of diplomatic missions abroad 
or international diplomatic missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, in the 
practice, the PLO was accepted to conclude international agreements with states or 
international organization “for the benefit of the PA”66. We can affirm that the PA 
possesses the capacity to enter into relations with other states and international 
                                                          
63 Michael Emerson, “The Political and Legal Logic for Palestinian Statehood”, Centre for European Policy 
Studies (October 2011): 2. 
64 There are several small states, such as Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino, which are regarded as 
States but do not exercise effective competences and powers in the external security area.  
65 William T. Worster, “The exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over Palestine”, American University 
International Law Review 26, no. 5 (February 2012): 1167. 
66 Hajjaj, “International Recognition Evolving Statehood Criterion: Comparative Analysis of Palestine 
and Kosovo”, 33. 
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organizations, although this is often exercised through the PLO.  Moreover, there is no 
strict distinction between the PLO and PA. When interacting with the Palestinian 
government, states and international organizations sometimes refer to PA and others to 
PLO. Concretely, both maintain a functioning network of diplomatic relations, apart from 
participating in various international organizations with different status (from observer to 
associate or affiliate). Palestine currently obtained bilateral recognition from 137 states 
and recently some European governments have begun to formally recognize it67. It also 
established embassies, missions and general delegations in many countries, as an 
indication of its ability to enter into relations with other states.  
Overall, Palestine meets the basic requirements for statehood as enunciated in the 
Montevideo criteria. Even if in some respects it could be argued that some of them are 
only partially fulfilled, because of the lack of complete control of its borders and territory 
and internal political problems, there are enough evidences which back the Palestinian 
statehood within the meaning of the Montevideo criteria. However, as we argued in the 
first chapter, recognition is nowadays crucial to be entitled of all the rights and obligations 
deriving from being a state in the full sense of the term. Palestinian authorities are aware 
of this, and they made significant efforts with the aim to obtain full recognition by the 
international community, in bilateral and multilateral terms.  
2.3 STRATEGY FOR DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL RECOGNITION 
Palestinian strategy for international recognition is not static. Since the Declaration of 
Independence, the PLO and the PA made important steps towards a greater recognition 
of the Palestinian state. Currently, Palestine enjoys bilateral recognition from 137 states, 
whose majority extended recognition immediately after the declaration. Other states 
recognized Palestine later following intense bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts 
by Palestinian authorities68.  
The declaration was not a unilateral and isolated action made by Arafat and the PLO69. It 
was part of a bigger strategy with the goal to seek international recognition through 
                                                          
67 State of Palestine, “Palestinian Government”, Mission of Palestine in Denmark. 
http://palestine.dk/palestine/government/ (Last Accessed 28 February 2018). 
68 State of Palestine, “Diplomatic Relations”, Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the 
United Nations. http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/ (Last Accessed 28 February 
2018). 
69 Arafat was one of the most controversial personalities of the 21st century. He founded Fatah in 1959; in 
1969 he was nominated Chairman of the PLO; in 1988 after the declaration of independence he became 
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bilateral diplomatic efforts. This strategy aimed at creating an effective governmental 
structure of the state of Palestine and obtaining widespread support. Another goal was to 
convince Israeli public opinion that the PLO was committed towards a peaceful 
coexistence70. Even if at the end of 1989 Palestine was already recognized by around 100 
states, its efforts were only partially successful. Among the recognizing states there were 
Arab, African, Latin American and Eastern European states, and also some of the most 
significant world powers such as Russia, China, India and Indonesia, two of which 
permanent members of the SC71. However, no Western European countries fully 
recognized Palestine in the aftermath of the declaration, and it was also the result of a 
deliberate strategy by US and Israel in that direction.  
This strategy was gradually abandoned in favour of a different vision based on the idea 
that the resolution of the conflict with Israel was the best way to obtain greater recognition 
by the whole international community. The process of negotiations which started with the 
Madrid Conference and brought to the Oslo Accords, served the PLO to ensure that 
neither Jordan nor an independent delegation were the representatives of the Palestinian 
people. In this struggle for representation the PLO was quite successful given the fact that 
on the one side it recognized Israel’s right to exist, while on the other Israel recognized 
the PLO as the sole entity representing Palestinians72. Due to this engagement in 
negotiations with the mediation of the US and the support of the Arab states, Palestinian 
authorities officially abandoned the unilateral path and linked its political future to the 
solution of the conflict with Israel. The Oslo II Agreement clearly stated that no unilateral 
steps or initiatives that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had to 
be taken neither by Israel nor by Palestine. This unequivocally meant that the status of 
Palestine relied on the peace process with Israel. Unfortunately, all the efforts made by 
                                                          
President of the PLO; during the following years he was engaged in negotiations with Israel to end the 
conflict, which failed. After his death in Paris in October 2004, in circumstances which remains unclear, it 
became evident the importance that Arafat had for all the Palestinians in the struggle for national self-
determination. He was able to maintain the unity, even with some setbacks, of the Palestinians. His 
successor, Mahmoud Abbas, has not the same credibility at the eyes of the Palestinians, and since he took 
power, internal conflicts spread through the Palestinian side. In order to have a clearer image of Yasser 
Arafat read: Barry Rubin & Judith Colp Rubin, Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
70 Jerome M. Segal, “Creating the Palestinian State: Revisited”, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, 
Economics and Culture 20, no. 2 (2015). http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1613 (Last accessed 2 March 
2018). 
71 Worster, “The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC over Palestine”, 1169. 
72 Segal, “Creating the Palestinian State: Revisited”.  
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the international community towards a peaceful and definitive solution to the conflict 
failed, included the desperate attempt made by President Clinton just before the end of 
his mandate at Camp David.  
Arafat’s death and the election of Mahmoud Abbas73 as head of the PLO and President 
of the PA, provoked a change in Palestinian strategy for recognition. He opted for the 
internationalization of the struggle for statehood. Moreover, he continued an international 
campaign to gain broader recognition, with a particular focus on the EU, whose members’ 
recognition could mean a strong push in favour of Palestinian cause. Abbas’ foreign 
policy looked especially at gaining Palestinian membership in diverse international 
organizations, together with a campaign against Israel, including at the ICC and the ICJ. 
He considers that sooner or later the entire international community will recognize the 
state of Palestine, and that continued violation of human rights by Israel through its 
discriminatory policy of occupation will be the most powerful weapon in the hand of the 
Palestinians. Abbas also wants to internationalize future peace talks with Israel, replacing 
bilateral negotiations with American mediation with a model similar to the one which 
brought to the Iran nuclear deal, characterized by the participation of the five permanent 
members of the SC and the EU74.  
In addition, Abbas and the PA carried out a plan aimed at establishing diplomatic relations 
with the highest number of states and maintaining a network of embassies, missions and 
general delegations throughout the world, following a path already started by Arafat. He 
was successful in establishing diplomatic relations with many states which recognized 
Palestine after the Declaration of Independence. In Africa and the Middle East embassies 
were established in Algeria, Ghana, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Senegal, 
Nigeria, Mali, Libya, Iran, Iraq etc. In Asia, Palestinian embassies were set up in China, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam75. In Europe, the majority of Eastern European 
countries recognized Palestine in 1988 (Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, Albania, Slovakia 
                                                          
73 Mahmoud Abbas participated in negotiations of the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords, and he 
was part of the Palestinian delegation in Camp David. In 2003, after intense international pressure, Abbas 
became Prime Minister as an effort to overthrow Arafat, who was considered by USA as an obstacle to the 
peace process. Following Arafat’s death in November 2004, Abbas was named head of the PLO, and in 
2005 he won elections to become President of the PA.  
74 Michael Herzog, “Abbas: in search of a new strategy”, Britain Israel Communications and Research 
Centre (February 2018). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/abbas-search-new-strategy (Last 
accessed 5 March 2018). 
75 Panganiban, “Palestinian Statehood: A Study of Statehood through the Lens of the Montevideo 
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and Poland among them, and later the Russian Federation), and the reason is quite clear. 
The Soviet Union was close to its disintegration and the nations forming part of it clearly 
supported the principle of self-determination because they would benefit later by it. The 
problem was that neither powerful European countries nor American ones had officially 
opened diplomatic relations with Palestine, because they did not identify it as a state.  
For this reason, Abbas’ strategy focused on these countries, apart from international 
organizations, to upgrade the status of Palestine. In the case of Latin America, this 
strategy was pretty successful given the fact that Palestinian embassies were opened in 
Venezuela in 2009, Ecuador and Bolivia in 2010, and Chile, Brazil, Dominica, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay in 201176. Less progresses were made with European 
countries. The majority of them still did not officially recognized Palestine, limiting their 
strategy to the opening of missions or special delegations in their territories. Apart from 
Russia and countries which made part of the Soviet Union, embassies were opened only 
Montenegro in 2006, Iceland in 2011 and Sweden in 2014. Missions and special 
delegations were established in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, UK, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece and the Netherlands. However, this only meant the recognition of the 
PLO as subject of international law, but not as a state.  
It can be said that both Arafat and Abbas understood the importance of a diplomatic 
approach as the first step towards a full recognition of Palestinian statehood. Even during 
long periods, such as the current one, in which negotiations seem to be at a deadlock, 
Palestine has never stopped working in this direction. At the present time, the priority of 
the PLO is to upgrade its status in the most influencing international organizations, and 
many efforts have been directed to obtain full membership in the UN, which is almost 
universally considered as the definitive step to gain full international recognition of 
Palestinian’s statehood. Recently, the Trump’s election and his stance strongly in favour 
of Israel, as proved by his recognition of Jerusalem as its capital and his intention to move 
US’ Embassy from Tel Aviv to the holy city, provoked a strong condemnation by the 
international community, more and more lined up with Palestine. After Trump’s 
declaration the UNGA approved a resolution against his statement, with 128 votes in 
                                                          
76 In order to have a whole vision of Palestinian diplomatic relations around the world have a look at: 
Palestine Embassies and Consulates, “List of Diplomatic Missions in Palestine & Palestinian Diplomatic 
Missions abroad”, Embassy Worldwide. https://www.embassy-worldwide.com/country/palestine/ (Last 
accessed 15 March 2018). 
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favour and only 9 against it. It is not clear what will be the next developments, but it 
seems evident that the UN will play a central role.  
 
3. PALESTINE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Until now we focused on Palestinian efforts to obtain bilateral recognition and enhance 
its status in the international arena. However, this is not the only dimension of the 
Palestinian plan for recognition. In fact, many energies have been devoted to the 
obtainment of membership in international organizations, such as the UN, UNESCO and 
the ICC, and to the ratification of many treaties and international conventions. This is not 
totally new because during its first years of existence the PLO made numerous efforts to 
become part of regional organizations especially within the Arab region. In 1969 it was 
admitted to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, in 1976 it became part of the Arab 
League, and one year later it obtained membership in the UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia. These efforts increased under Abbas’ presidency, who 
due to the long-stalled peace process, began to look for alternatives direct negotiations 
with Israel. Membership in international organizations, especially the UN, became crucial 
because even if it does not determine that an entity is a state, it presupposes that it acquires 
all the rights and obligations that membership in the UN implies under international law. 
Palestinian authorities worked in that direction, as it seems clear that negotiations with 
Israel are currently in a phase of impasse, and it will take time and maybe a political 
change in Israel (and US) for peace process to be reinitiated. 
3.1 THE HISTORY OF PALESTINE AND THE UN 
The first concrete step towards Palestine’s full membership in the UN was made in 1974, 
when the PLO was granted the status of non-member observer entity. Nevertheless, this 
was only the conclusion of a broader process of mutual approach between the UN and the 
PLO. On December 1973, the GA adopted an important resolution, urging that national 
liberation movements be invited to participate as observers in the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflict77. Later, on October 1974, it adopted Resolution 32/10, which recognized 
                                                          
77 State of Palestine, “Status of Palestine”, Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the 
United Nations. http://palestineun.org/status-of-palestine-at-the-united-nations/ (Last accessed 7 March 
2018). 
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the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and invited it to participate 
in the plenary meetings of the GA on the question of Palestine. On 13 November Yasser 
Arafat, as a President of the PLO, addressed the GA in a landmark appearance in which 
he delivered his famous speech: “Today I have come, bearing an olive branch and a 
freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”. Just a few days 
later, Resolution 32/73 was passed, granting to the PLO the status of non-member 
observer. This status was later extended to include all the UN bodies78. The decision was 
certainly welcomed by the PLO and the Palestinian people, because it was seen as a 
reaffirmation of the support of the GA for the creation of the Palestinian state and its 
commitment to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. 
Through the 70’s and the first half of the 80’s no significant steps ahead were made in the 
resolution of the conflict. Tension was high, Israel continued with its restrictive policies 
in the OPT and episodes of terrorism were still common. In December 1987, the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank spontaneously reacted to 20 years of occupation through massive 
demonstrations and strikes demanding the end of the occupation. The SC, the GA and the 
Secretary General repeatedly affirmed their concern for the disproportionate measures 
took by the occupying forces to repress the intifada. UNSC Resolution 605 strongly 
condemned the practices of the Israeli armed forces and their violations of human rights 
in the OPT, making also reference to the Fourth Geneva Conference regarding the 
protection of civilians in times of war. Later in 1988, with a strategic and diplomatic 
move, the PNC declared unilaterally the independent state of Palestine in a meeting in 
Alger. As I already mentioned, the declarations provoked a wave of recognition by a high 
number of states. The GA acknowledged the proclamation of the state of Palestine and 
decided that the designation “Palestine” had to be used instead of “PLO” in the UN 
system79. During the 90’s the UN sponsored the peace process started with the Madrid 
Conference. In 1992 it was invited to participate in the negotiations as “extra regional 
participant” in the different working groups created to deal with various issues (regional 
security, water, environment, refugees, economic development etc.). The GA expressed 
full support for the DOP signed by Israel and the PLO, in which they mutually recognized 
each other, and stressed its will to be more active in the resolution of the Palestinian-
                                                          
78 United Nations, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations, 24. 
79 State of Palestine, “Status of Palestine”. 
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Israeli conflict80. However, the following years saw very little progress if compared with 
the expectation created by the signing of the Oslo Accords. Some attempts were made in 
order to advance in the implementation of the DOP81, but all the agreements ended with 
no or only limited implementation. The outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 meant a 
deep blow to the peace process. The GA showed its concern for the deterioration of the 
situation in the OPT and repeatedly called for the immediate cessation of violence and 
the need to find a two-state solution.  
In 2003, the Quartet (USA, EU, Russia and the UN) prepared a roadmap, which was also 
endorsed by the SC, calling for the “creation of an independent Palestinian state with 
provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty”, and the “promotion of international 
recognition of a Palestinian state, including possible UN membership”82. The Road Map 
was a three-phase plan, to be implemented gradually through incremental steps and based 
on UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002) and on the principles laid 
by the Madrid Conference83. However, the efforts by the Quartet have been continuously 
affected by differences between the parties, which agree (at least theoretically) about the 
two-state solution but have different strategies about how to reach it. Furthermore, the 
impasse in the relations between Israel and the Palestinian authorities, aggravated by the 
victory of Hamas in the democratic elections held in 2006, represented an additional 
obstacle for the solution of the conflict and the consequent recognition of Palestine. Abbas 
chose a unilateral diplomatic strategy to obtain recognition form the highest number of 
states in order to influence also its future membership in the UN. With a move coherent 
with his strategy, on September 2011 he submitted a formal request to the Secretary 
General Ban Ki Moon, asking the UN to admit the Palestine as a full member84. The bid, 
                                                          
80 United Nations, The question of Palestine and the United Nations, 30-31. 
81 Various agreements were signed between the 90’s and the beginning of 2000’s. For instance, in 1995 the 
parties signed the Interim Agreement, which provided for the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the 
Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority. Later, in 1997, PLO and Israel signed the Hebron Protocol, 
concerning the redistribution of Israeli forces in the zone. In 1998, after days of talks promoted by the USA, 
the Wye River Memorandum was concluded, as an attempt to resume permanent status negotiations. It 
provided for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the 13% of the West Bank, while the PLO 
committed to take measures to counter terrorism. The last and probably most productive effort was made 
by US President Bill Clinton in Camp David in the summer of 2000. In this case both Edu Barak (the new 
Israeli Prime Minister) and Arafat declared that they were really close to a final solution to the conflict, but 
at the end nothing was done and the outbreak of the second intifada closed the doors to permanent 
negotiations to be resumed.  
82 United Nations, “A Performance-Based RoadMap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict”, April 2003. 
83 United Nations, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations, 48. 
84 BBC News, “Palestinians’ Upgraded UN status”, 30 November 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
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as expected, stalled two months later after the SC was unable to make a recommendation, 
especially due to US intention to use its veto power85. Abbas then submitted a 
downgraded request to the GA for admission to the UN as a non-member observer state. 
In a historic session on 29 November 2012, the GA voted by a huge majority Resolution 
67/19 to recognize Palestine as non-member state with observer status in the 
organization86. In terms of Palestine’s rights of participation in the GA, the resolution 
changes little. In fact, prior to its designation as an observer non-member state, Palestine 
already had rights of participation in the sessions and the work of the GA comparable to 
those of the observer states. The importance of the vote is more symbolic because it can 
be read as a de facto recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Palestine, and because 
it had a broader impact on the question of Palestinian statehood in international law87.  
3.2 FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The upgrade of Palestine’s status in the UN to observer non-member state through GA 
Resolution 67/19 raised a debate about those who consider that with that move the UN 
has officially recognized the state of Palestine, and those who back the idea that it was 
only symbolic and did not mean the collective recognition of the Palestinian statehood by 
the international community. The first aspect to highlight is that statehood and 
membership in UN and other international organizations are two distinct issues. There 
are cases of states which are recognized as such but are not members of the UN, and on 
the other side there are members of the UN which at the time of their admission did not 
fulfil the Montevideo criteria of statehood88. However, it is also true that the admission 
as a full member of the UN (and other international organizations) is universally seen as 
                                                          
middle-east-13701636 (Last accessed 10/03/2018). 
85 The procedure for the admission in the UN begins with the submission of an application to the Secretary 
General by the state. Then, the SC has to consider the application and approve a recommendation for 
admission which must receive the affirmative votes of 9 of the 15 members of the Council (provided that 
none of its 5 permanent members have voted against the application). Only in case the SC recommends 
admission, the recommendation is presented to the GA for consideration, and it must be backed by the two-
thirds of the GA for admission of a new state.  
86 138 countries voted in favour of the resolution, 41 abstained and only 9 voted against: Canada, Czech 
Republic, Israel, U.S., Panama, The Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru and Micronesia.  
87 John Cerone, “Legal Implications of the UNGA Vote to Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State”, 
American Society of International Law 16, no. 37 (December 2012): 1. 
88 For instance, Switzerland entered UN only in 2002 but it was considered a state much before. On the 
other side, Ukraine y Belarus, which are among the founding members, were not states in 1945, and the 
same for India which obtained independence only in 1947. The fact is that it was required only to admitted 
members to be states which respect all the conditions enounced in the Charter, while it was not a requisite 
for founding members.  
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the legitimation and confirmation of statehood and the official collective recognition that 
an entity is a state within the international community. When it comes to UN membership, 
political considerations often became more important and somehow determine the real 
status of an entity in the international order.  
This is clearly the case of Palestine and its bid for full membership in the UN. The 
organization has recognized the existence of the state of Palestine much before the 
decision to upgrade its status to observer non-member state. A fundamental clause of the 
Resolution 67/19 expressed the hope that the SC will consider favourably the application 
submitted by the state of Palestine to full membership. This assumption implicitly accepts 
the statehood of Palestine as a fact previous to the resolution89. Moreover, Palestine fulfils 
the obligations for UN membership. Article 4 (1) of the Charter states that “membership 
in the UN is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained 
in the present Charter and […] are able and willing to carry out these obligations90”. 
Palestine explicitly declared its commitment to the UN Charter in its Declaration of 
Independence. It undoubtedly transmitted its commitment and willingness to respect the 
purposes and principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Palestine also expressly rejected the use of any form of violence or intimidation against 
any other state and accepted all the obligations contained in the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1907 Hague Resolutions, the basis of international humanitarian law 
and the law of war91. In this sense Resolution 67/19 represented a step ahead, because it 
granted Palestine the competence to ratify UN conventions and other international 
treaties. This competence was used in 2014 when Palestine ratified fourteen treaties and 
became a state party to the Geneva Conventions regulating the conduct of armed 
conflict92. It also important to remember that in October 2011 Palestine had been accepted 
as a full member by UNESCO, becoming the 195th full member of the Educational, 
                                                          
89 John Quigley, “Palestine Statehood and International Law”, Global Policy Essay (January 2013): 2. 
90Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), Article 4. 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf (Last accessed 13 March 2018). 
91 Saeb Erikat, “Palestine Liberation Organization Legal Brief in Support of Recognition of the State of 
Palestine”, in Palestine Membership in the UN: Legal and Practical Implications, ed. Mutaz Qafisheh, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2013), 25.  
92 Palestine ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; UN Convention Against Torture; UN Convention 
Against Corruption; UN Genocide Convention; Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid; Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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Scientific and Cultural organization93. All these progresses showed on one side the 
motivation of Palestine to be granted full membership in the UN, and on the other that 
political conflict of interests within the organization are the only real cause impeding 
Palestine to obtain UN full membership. 
Rule 134 in the GA Rules of Procedure provides that “Any state which desires to become 
a Member of the UN shall submit an application to the Secretary General. Such 
application shall contain a declaration […] that the state in question accepts the 
obligations contained in the Charter”94. From this point of view there is no doubt that 
Palestine has the will to obtain full membership, as proved by the submission of an official 
application in 2011, and its continuous commitment to the principles and the obligations 
of the UN Charter. However, the decisive competence is in the hands of the SC, which, 
upon the request of the Secretary General, must make a recommendation about the 
admission. When the SC recommends an applicant state for membership, the GA is the 
organ that effects the recommendation by a two-thirds majority of the members95. In case 
it does not, because at least one of the permanent members uses its veto power, then the 
GA may send the application back to the SC. Therefore, what emerges from this 
procedure is that the SC is empowered with the last decision, as happened in 2011 when 
Abbas’ bid for full recognition was blocked by the veto of the US in the SC. 
In the case of Palestine, the political conflict of interests with US is a critical factor within 
this puzzle. In addition to Israel, the US has been a leading opponent of the Palestinian 
statehood bid in the UN. Israel is a fundamental American ally in the Middle-East, and 
their relations are really strong economically, military and diplomatically. Because of this 
alliance, US always supported Israel’s claims and it often criticized the UN (especially in 
the last years) because of its supposed support towards the Palestinian cause. Through the 
years it used veto power more than forty times to block resolutions of the SC regarding 
the right of self-determination of Palestinians, the illegality of Jewish settlements, the 
situation in the OPT, the Palestinian refugees, or the status of Jerusalem, just to make 
                                                          
93 Steven Erlanger, “UNESCO accepts Palestinians as full members”, The New York Times, 31 October 
2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/middleeast/unesco-approves-full-membership-for-
palestinians.html (Last accessed 15 March 2018).  
94 United Nations General Assembly, “Rules of Procedure governing the admission of new Members”, 
United Nations. http://www.un.org/ga/ropga_adms.shtml (Last accessed 19 March 2018). 
95 Basheer Al Zoughbi, “The de iure State of Palestine under Belligerent Occupation: Application for 
Admission to the UN”, The Applied Research Institute (November 2011): 2.  
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some examples96. The last time, until now, that the US blocked a resolution was in 
December 2017, when it rejected a proposal condemning Donald Trump’s move to 
recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Two important facts emerge if we look at the 
records of voting behaviour: in all of these blocked resolutions US was the only 
permanent member to veto and in most of them all the other fourteen members of the SC 
voted in favour (only in some cases few states abstained).  
By considering all these factors, the perspectives for Palestine in terms of UN full 
membership are really dark, at least in the short-term. Given the current political scenario 
in the US and Israel, the possibilities for Palestine to be admitted as a full member in the 
UN are little. Anyway, what clearly emerges is that the UN admission procedure should 
be somehow revised together with the issue of the use of the veto power. In fact, as stated 
in 1969 by Jordanian Diplomat Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh “The UN Charter is a master in 
utopia […] and its basic principles are unquestionable. But in the most crucial issues, the 
voices, conscience and votes of the overwhelming majority of mankind remain ineffectual, 
because power evidently lies somewhere else”97. This quote expresses perfectly the 
current inability by the UN to find a solution to conflict and makes effective what most 
of the world think: Palestine is already a state and should be enabled to fully join the UN 
in order to have all the rights and obligations that this implies. The SC suffers from 
inherent deficiencies which make it ineffective most of the times. The veto power as it is 
functioning today is not likely to change soon and the extremely high voting coincidence 
between US and Israel at the UN is likely to continue in the same line98. However, this 
kind of discourses should not impose over the will of the people and the clear majority of 
the international community, because it goes undoubtedly against the principles upon 
which the UN lies.  
3.3 PALESTINE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
As part of its strategy of internationalization of the Palestinian cause, Abbas also sought 
for an engagement with international criminal justice. On the one side, the attempts to 
obtain UN full membership were also aimed at becoming a party to the ICJ, which is one 
                                                          
96 Saliba Sarsar, “The Question of Palestine and United States Behaviour at the UN”, International Journal 
of Politics, Culture and Society 17, no. 3 (March 2004): 463-64. 
97 Cattan, Palestine, the Arabs and Israel, (London: Longman Publishing Group, 1969), xiii. 
98 Sarsar, “The Question of Palestine and United States Behaviour at the UN”, 467. 
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of its organs. On the other, he looked for Palestinian membership in the ICC, which 
enables access to its jurisdiction.  
3.3.1 Palestine and the ICJ 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN and it was established by the UN Charter. 
All the 193 members of the UN are automatically members of the ICJ. Palestine is not 
full member of the organization, and its extraordinary legal status of non-member 
observer state raises questions about the possibility for Palestine to become member of 
the ICJ even if it does not obtain full member status in the UN. However, before the 
upgrade of its status in 2012, Palestine had already been a matter of concern for the ICJ, 
which has been confronted with aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In December 
2003, after the US vetoed a UNSC resolution which declared the construction of the wall 
as illegal, the GA asked the ICJ to urgently render an advisory opinion on the question of 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories99. The ICJ complied with the request, but it was unable to reach a consensus 
and there was a long debate within it in order to take a decision. Finally, the majority of 
the Court found that the construction of the wall in the OPT, including in and around East 
Jerusalem, was contrary to international law. Even if advisory opinions have not juridical 
effects because they are not binding, this pronouncement by the Court against Israel was 
quite important within the context of the conflict and the international status of Palestine. 
Among the reasons why the construction of the wall was contrary to international law, 
the Court cited the infringement of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian 
people, as laid down in Article 1 of the UN Charter. Moreover, it was asserted that by 
constructing the wall Israel violated the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
Civilians Persons in Time of War, because it implied the destruction or requisition of 
property of Palestinians which is contrary to Article 53 of the Convention100 . According 
to the Court, Israel was under obligation to terminate its breaches of international law, 
cease the works of construction and make reparation for the damage caused101. Therefore, 
                                                          
99 Nidal Al-Farajin & Alexandra Engelsdorfer, ʺAcceptance of International Criminal Justice and the Path 
to the International Criminal Court in Palestine”, in After Nuremberg. Exploring Multiple Dimensions of 
the Acceptance of International Criminal Justice, eds. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Friederike Mieth & Marjana 
Papa (Nuremberg: International Nuremberg Principles Academy, 2017), 4. 
100 The Article 53 states that “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property 
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or 
to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations.” 
101 David Morrison, “ICJ Advisory Opinion: a Summary”, Labour and Trade Union Review (August 2004). 
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the ICJ clearly stated that the wall built by Israel was illegal and this represented a strong 
push for Palestine in the context of its strategy of internationalisation. The overwhelming 
majority of the nations expressed their support of the findings of the ICJ in a resolution 
approved by the GA on that issue102.  
This was the only time the ICJ pronounced on issues related with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, even if it was through an advisory opinion. In the case of contentious opinions, 
which are much more important because they are binding, only member states can present 
a case before the Court. Moreover, only full members of the UN are automatically 
empowered to bring a case before the ICJ. The chances of Palestine to get full 
membership are low at this time, because of US’ veto in the SC. Therefore, it needs to 
look for other ways to bring a case before the ICJ against Israel without being granted full 
membership within the UN.  
The first possibility would be for a non-member UN state to become a party to the ICJ 
Statute. It is technically possible, as five non-UN members states joined it since 1946. 
Only later they became full members of the UN, but at the time they ratified the ICJ 
Statute they had not such a status. In each of these five cases the conditions were similar: 
acceptance of the provisions of the ICJ Statute, acceptance of all the obligations of a UN 
member under Article 94 of the UN Charter, and undertaking to contribute to the expenses 
of the ICJ103. Palestine already declared its acceptance of the ICJ Statute and UN Charter 
provisions, even if some doubts have been raised about Palestinian capacity to contribute 
to the expenses of the ICJ given its fragile organizational structure. However, as in the 
case of UN membership, there is an obstacle. Article 93 (2) of the UN Charter establishes 
that “A state which is not member of the UN may become a party to the Statute of the ICJ 
on conditions to be determined in each case by the GA upon the recommendation of the 
SC”104. There is little doubt that the GA would support Palestinian membership in the 
ICJ, but there is still less about the US recourse of its veto power which would impede to 
transmit to the GA a favourable recommendation105.  
                                                          
http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/palestine/wall-illegal-adop-sum.htm (Last accessed 27 March 2018). 
102 The vote was 150-6 with 10 abstentions. The six countries voting in contrary were US and Israel, for 
obvious reasons, Australia, Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federate State of Micronesia. 
103 Charles F. Whitman, “Palestine’s Statehood and Ability to Litigate in the ICJ”, California Western 
International Law Journal 44, no. 1, (2013): 90. 
104 Charter of the United Nations, Article 93. 
105 It is important to highlight that a debate exists about whether the admission to the ICJ Statute is a 
procedural matter. If it is, then the affirmative vote by nine members of the SC would allow Palestine to 
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Another option for Palestine would be to bring a contentious case before the ICJ under 
specific conditions, without being part of the UN or the ICJ. This possibility is 
contemplated in Article 35 (2) of the ICJ Statute, which leaves the door open to states 
which are neither members of the UN nor of the ICJ, even if it gives to the SC the 
competence to determine the conditions under which it could happen. The same is 
confirmed in UNSC Resolution 9 of 1946, which affirms that the ICJ is open to non-
member states in case they have accepted its jurisdiction and the obligations of the UN 
Charter. However, also this option presents some jurisdictional obstacles. In fact, because 
Palestine is not a party to the ICJ Statute, it is difficult for it to know in advance whether 
ICJ would have jurisdiction over a dispute. Moreover, the opposing state could refuse the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ leaving Palestine with no other recourses. Therefore, even if the 
ICJ would accept its jurisdiction over a case presented by Palestine, finding a party that 
would consent to ICJ jurisdiction represents the biggest obstacles. The Article 36 of the 
ICJ Statute encourages mutual consent, and it means that states cannot be compelled to 
accept ICJ jurisdiction106.  
The last option could be that of finding a treaty which has some provisions that gives the 
ICJ jurisdiction to settle disputes between state parties to that treaty. Approximately 300 
bilateral or multilateral treaties contain such provisions, and Palestine signed a lot of them 
as part of its strategy of internationalization. However, in this case the main obstacle is 
that it must be proved that the dispute involves the application of one of those treaties’ 
terms. One example could be the Genocide Convention or the Convention against 
Torture, but Palestine should allege that genocide or torture occurred in its territory. This 
is a difficult operation because of all the juridical matters involved which make unlikely 
for states to convince the Court to activate its jurisdiction under a specific treaty. 
In conclusion, even if other paths exist for Palestine to present a contentious case before 
the ICJ against Israel, apart from becoming a full member of the UN, this perspective 
seems unlikely for two main reasons: the fact that the SC recommendation is needed 
independently on the options which Palestine could choose, and the necessity of the 
consent of the cited state. What seems more likely is that, as recently requested by the 
                                                          
join the ICJ Statute. If it is not, therefore all the permanent members can exert their veto power. Obviously, 
US is a supporter of the second interpretation, and this is a huge obstacle for Palestinian chances to enter 
the ICJ.  
106 Whitman, “Palestine’s Statehood and the Ability to Litigate in the ICJ”, 96-98. 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN, the ICJ might issue an advisory opinion 
on the failure of both Israel and Palestine (especially Hamas) to comply with humanitarian 
and human rights law. This could have a strong symbolic effect but nothing more if no 
legal obligations for the parties are created.  
3.3.2 The Rome Statute and the ICC 
Unlike the ICJ, the ICC is legally and functionally independent from the UN. It is a 
permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute in 1998 to prosecute individuals 
accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression107. It formally 
entered into force in July 2002 upon ratification by 60 states108. The ICC contributes to 
fight against impunity and establish the rule of law by ensuring that the most severe 
crimes do not go unpunished, and by promoting respect for international law. Moreover, 
it was not created to substitute national tribunals, but to complement them.  
The first time Palestine approached the ICC was in 2009. This came on the back of Israel’s 
Operation Cast Lead assault on Gaza in late December 2008, in a broader context in which 
the idea that war crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed was gaining 
more and more support. That attack was the most extensive and devastating carried out 
in the Gaza Strip since the Six-Day War of 1967. Following the end of hostilities, several 
UN officials and NGO’s called for an investigation into war crimes perpetrated by both 
sides, the Israeli Defence Forces and Hamas, in the course of the attacks. Nevertheless, 
the focus was mainly on the former, because of the disproportionate number of causalities 
suffered by Palestinians when compared with Israelis109. The PA, which was feeling 
always more legitimized after the general reactions condemning Israeli attacks, decided 
to submit a declaration to the Registrar of the ICC accepting its jurisdiction over 
international crimes committed in Palestine since 1st July 2002, the date the Court entered 
                                                          
107 In 1998, the negotiating parties in Rome equipped the ICC with jurisdiction over four crimes, included 
aggression. However, jurisdiction over this crime was made subject to further negotiations, since no 
consensus was reached on its definition in the Rome Statute. In 2010, the state parties met in Uganda in an 
effort to finally define this crime. They agreed a definition, though it must be ratified by at least thirty states 
parties and then approved by a two-thirds majority vote to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction. Anyway, 20 years 
after the Rome Statute, disagreement still exists between states parties which are still debating how to 
activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  
108 Currently, more than 120 states ratified the Rome Statute.  
109 Some 1,300 Palestinians and some dozens of Israelis died between late 2008 and early 2009. Reports 
published by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, as well as investigations by the Arab League 
all concluded that Israel likely violated the laws of war. There are accusations that the IDF (Israeli 
Defence Forces) targeted civilians and non-military objects, including a UN school and headquarters, and 
used force out of proportion with the military objectives).  
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into force110. Given the fact that neither Palestine nor Israel were state parties to the Rome 
Statute, the declaration submitted by Palestinian Minister of Justice Ali Khashan was 
based on Article 12 (3) of the Statute, which allows even non-member states to gain 
access to ad hoc jurisdictions over crimes committed on their territories. In response, the 
ICC prosecutors opened a primary examination on Palestine which was focused mostly 
on the issue of Palestinian statehood under international law. While those who opposed 
to Palestinian declaration relied its arguments on classical notions of how a state is 
defined under the Montevideo Convention, to conclude that Palestine is not a state and 
by consequence should be impeded from accessing the Court, the PA’s approach was 
based on the premise that “short of actual statehood, Palestine is a “state” for the 
purpose of Article 12 of the Rome Statute because it is sufficiently an international entity 
to be bound by International Humanitarian Law […] then Palestine should also be 
treated as a “state” by the court that is responsible for the enforcement of IHL”111. 
Palestine did not ask the ICC to recognize the state of Palestine, but only to make sure 
that the conditions necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction were fulfilled. The ICC 
prosecutors concluded that due to its uncertain status with respect to statehood under 
international law, Palestine’s declaration could not be accepted112. 
In 2012 the PA asked the ICC to review the admissibility of its declaration recognizing 
the Court’s jurisdiction, a demand justified by the fact that at that time Palestine had 
already been recognized by some 130 states and many international and regional 
organizations. The Prosecutor once again declined the authority to rule on such 
admissibility, since he was not empowered to define the term “state” for the purposes of 
Article 12 (3)113. It is curious how the prosecutor completely ignored the fact that as a 
result of membership in UNESCO obtained in November 2011, Palestine was able to 
ratify the Statute based on the “Summary of the Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties” document. According to this document, an entity is 
                                                          
110 Michael Kearney and John Reynolds, “Palestine and the Politics of International Criminal Justice”, in 
The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, eds. William A. 
Schabas, Yvonne McDermott & Niamh Hayes (London: Routledge, 2013), 420. 
111 Palestinian Negotiations Support Unit, “Legal Approaches to be advanced at the ICC in order to Protect 
Overall Palestinian Strategy and Realize Palestinian Rights and Interests”, 25 March 2009. 
http://www.ajtransparency.com/en/document/4494 (Last accessed 24 March 2018). 
112 Al-Farajin and Engelsdorfer, “Acceptance of international Criminal Justice and the Path to the ICC in 
Palestine”, 4. 
113 Emanuele Cimiotta and Micaela Frulli, “What is the legal relationship between the ICC and non-state 
entities: beyond the case of Palestine”, Questions of International Law, no. 20 (January 2015): 2. 
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to be regarded as a state entitled to ratify treaties open to all states, where that entity is a 
member of the UN or a UN specialised agency. Therefore, the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to consider Palestine a state for the purposes of the Rome Statute clearly missed a 
fundamental aspect. However, he left open the door to consider future allegations of 
crimes perpetrated in Palestine, but only when the UN resolved the legal issue regarding 
its status.  
This happened on 29 November 2012, when Palestine was granted “non-member 
observer state” status through GA Resolution 67/19. It acquired the capacity not only to 
sign and ratify other international treaties and conventions, but above all to join the Statute 
of the ICC. On 1 January 2015 Palestine applied for full membership with the ICC 
according to Article 125 and 126 of the Rome Statute114. The day after Palestine 
transmitted its accession application to the Secretary General and became officially part 
of the Rome Statute. Later, the Registrar of the ICC accepted the declaration which had 
been re-submitted by the PA and re-opened a preliminary examination on the situation in 
Palestine. This meant that “alleged crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory 
will be investigated and persecuted at the international level by an international 
court”115. This could pave the way for trials of Israeli and Hamas leaders for war crimes 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Focusing on a possible persecution of the former, there are 
several legal and practical obstacles.  
Firstly, even if the prosecutor decides to open an investigation, as it happened in this case, 
achieving a concrete prosecution could be difficult. In order to gather the necessary 
evidences to bring a case to the ICC, Israel’s cooperation is necessary, and it is unlikely 
that this may happen. Moreover, Israel (which is not member of the ICC) and its western 
allies, principally the US, will oppose all the actions against the former by pressuring the 
PA and the Court not to proceed with the case. Then, there are legal obstacles which could 
impede the ICC to act. As we said above, the ICC can only try crimes when national 
courts failed to do so. Therefore, in this case it should be demonstrated that Israel is 
unwilling or unable to “genuinely investigate or prosecute”. The ICC often applied low 
standards to determine whether a state is genuinely unwilling to investigate, and if Israel 
                                                          
114 In particular, the Article 125 affirms in the paragraph 1 that “This status shall be open for signature by 
all States”, and in the paragraph 3 that “This Statute shall be open to accession by all States”.  
115 Al-Farajin & Engelsdrofer, “Acceptance of International Criminal Justice and the Path to the ICC in 
Palestine”, 5. 
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will be able to demonstrate that its investigations are carried out in good faiths then the 
ICC will have no jurisdiction116. Finally, as the most important aspect, the Court must 
determine if the crimes committed in Palestinian territory from June 2014 onwards can 
be included within the crimes under its jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. At the present time, many international actors supported the idea that 
Israel is responsible for war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. The UN, in the 
words of the head of the Human Rights Council, repeatedly accused Israel of committing 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Also, various 
human rights groups and NGO’s submitted communications to the ICC asserting that 
Israeli officials have been responsible of those crimes117.  
Currently, the ICC is still in the phase of preliminary examinations. It is not clear what 
will be the decision by the Prosecutor, because there are many aspects to consider. What 
seems clear is that the general context around the Israel-Palestine conflict will have some 
influence on this issue. The US and Israel will exert an always more intense pressure in 
order to avoid an investigation and eventual persecution for the crimes mentioned above. 
The last decision is in the hand of the Prosecutor, and it will represent an important test 
of the ability of the ICC to accomplish which is original goal: to ensure that crimes against 
humanity and war crimes do not occur with impunity. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this work I tried to go through the issue of Palestinian statehood and recognition, both 
in bilateral and multilateral terms, in order to determine if Palestine is or not a state within 
the international community. Statehood and recognition are noticeably controversial and 
debated issues, given the fact that the interconnection between legal and political 
considerations often make difficult to clarify when an entity is a state. The case of 
Palestine is an example more that in many cases international law is too weak when it 
                                                          
116 Salma Karbi-Ayyoub, “Palestinian Membership of the ICC”, Al Jazeera Center for Studies (July 2015): 
4. 
117 It is important to highlight that the declaration of the PA open the way also for the investigation of Hamas 
for crimes committed against Israeli civilians. Many submissions were filled with supposed evidences of 
the responsibility of Hamas’ officers by the Israeli Government and many NGO’s. However, in this paper 
I focused on the importance for Palestine to access the ICC, therefore I have limited to talk about the 
possibility to judge Israeli officials only. This does not mean that Hamas could not be responsible such as 
Israel. It will depend on the results of the investigations and the decision by the Prosecutor.  
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comes to statehood. Geopolitical reasons often influence the ability of what is a state 
under international law to act as such, in particular when it is not able to obtain 
membership in the UN and other international organizations.  
As I explained in the first chapter, there are two main theories dealing with the issues of 
statehood and recognition. The declaratory theory, which is the most followed one, argues 
that an entity is a state if it fulfils the four criteria defined in the Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention: permanent population; defined territory; government; and 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The criterion of a permanent 
population presents no problems and is almost unchallenged. Palestinian authorities 
control a population of 5,000,000 people approximately in the West Bank and in the Gaza 
Strip. Moreover, in the OPT population and nation coincide, reinforcing the claim that 
Palestine has a permanent population and fulfils the first Montevideo criteria. The 
completion of the second criterion, a defined territory, has been challenged by those who 
consider that the fragmentation, imprecise delimitation and disputes with Israel upon it 
would make difficult to identify a territory as “defined”. However, I found many reasons 
to support the accomplishment of this condition by Palestine. Firstly, continuity is not an 
essential characteristic of the territory of a state. Secondly, the PLO repeatedly declared 
that the territory of the Palestinian state consists of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem as its capital, along the pre-1967 borders. The overwhelming majority of 
the international community, included the UN and the EU, supports this solution. Thirdly, 
the fact that do exist borders disputes with Israel does not affect the existence of Palestine 
as a state, as happens in many other cases. About the government criterion, it is the most 
problematic one because of the complexity of the Palestinian scenario. However, despite 
the political conflicts emerged between the PA and Hamas which somehow limited 
Palestinian capacity to carry out effective governmental functions, Palestinian authorities 
are responsible for the majority of the most important of them, such as the judiciary, 
legislative and executive, in areas of education, social welfare, taxation, etc. This is 
enough to say that Palestine satisfies the government criteria as defined in the Montevideo 
Convention. As regards the last condition, the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states, this function is carried out either by the PLO or the PA. Though the PA, according 
the DOP, has not powers in the sphere of foreign relations, it is the PLO which was 
accepted to conclude international agreements and open diplomatic relations with other 
states. Therefore, Palestine accomplishes this criterion, either through the PA or the PLO. 
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According to this analysis, I found that Palestine is a state according to the declaratory 
theory because it fulfils all the Montevideo criteria. 
Even if it is hugely accepted that recognition by other states does not determine if an 
entity is a state under international law, those who backed the constitutive theory holds 
that the very legal existence of a state as part of the international system is constituted by 
the recognition by the other members of the system. In order to determine if Palestine is 
a state according to the constitutive theory I analysed how successful has been the 
Palestinian strategy for recognition, from all points of view. In bilateral terms, Palestinian 
authorities have been partially effective in their attempt to obtain the recognition of the 
greatest number of states. Since 1988 Declaration of Independence to the present time, 
the state of Palestine was officially recognized by 137 states, which represent more than 
the 70%. It is true that only a little number of European and Western countries did it, but 
here the problem lies in geopolitical interests related to the conflict with Israel, more than 
in a unacceptance by these states to recognise the legitimacy of Palestine. In multilateral 
terms, Palestinian efforts produced even better results. Palestine is member of many 
important regional organizations, such as the Arab League and the organization of Islamic 
Cooperation. Many steps ahead were done also in relation to the UN system. On October 
2011, Palestine gained full membership in UNESCO, and one year and a few months later 
its status within the UN was upgraded to non-member observer state. This meant the 
official recognition by the UN of the existence of the state of Palestine and the 
confirmation that the only obstacle against Palestinian full UN membership is the 
presence of the US as permanent member with veto power in the SC. Finally, the 
Palestinian approach to international courts such as the ICJ and above all the ICC is a 
further validation of what has been defended in this work. The Palestinian membership 
of the ICC in 2015 is an historic milestone in Palestinian history because it could bring 
Israeli before international justice. The conclusion is that, even if we take as a reference 
the constitutive theory, Palestine is a state because it obtained a huge level of bilateral 
and multilateral recognition, especially within the UN, and because it was successful in 
many senses in its attempts to act as a state within the international system.  
Having considered all these issues I deducted that Palestine is a state both under the 
declaratory and constitutive theory. Those who linked Palestinian statehood with the 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are wrong because these are two separated 
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issues which cannot be treated as a whole. Palestine is already a state because it is acting 
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